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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL B. SMITH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MONROE IVERSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. § 78-2-2(3 )(i) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff and Appellant Daniel B. Smith ("Mr. Smith") states 
the issue presented on appeal in this case as follows: 
Does a lessor's dual status, as both a lessor and a statutory 
employee, relieve the lessor from liability to a co-employee 
injured as a result of a breach of the lessor's duty of due care? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
Mr* Smith sustained serious personal injury when a truck 
owned and driven by defendant and respondent Monroe Iversen ("Mr. 
Iversen") backed over him at a construction site for the 
construction of the segment of 1-15. Mr. Iversen was joined as a 
defendant in this action on two theories: (1) that he was an 
independent contractor and not a statutory employee of the general 
1 
No. 90034 
Priority 16 
contractor on the construction site; and (2) that his status as 
lessor of the truck he was driving, which did not have a backup 
warning device, independently imposed liability upon Mr. Iversen. 
On Mr. Iversenfs Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court 
dismissed all claims against him based upon the District Courtf s 
conclusion that Mr. Iversen was a statutory employee of the general 
contractor and, therefore, insulated from all liability to his 
fellow employee, Mr. Smith.1 
B. Statement of Facts. 
James Cape & Sons, Inc. ("James Cape") was a general 
contractor for the construction of a portion of 1-15 located near 
Beaver, Utah.2 Ralph Smith Company was a subcontractor on the 
construction project.3 Mr. Smith was an employee of Ralph Smith 
Company.4 Mr. Iversen was one of the truck drivers Ralph Smith 
Company hired to work on the job site.5 
Under Mr. Iversenfs lease arrangement with Ralph Smith Company 
he leased the truck and trailer he owned to Ralph Smith Company and 
operated it for them. The particular lease in this case provided 
1
 A copy of the Summary Judgment and Order Dismissing Monroe 
Iversen dated May 29, 1990, is attached in the Addendum. 
2
 Memorandum of Monroe Iversen in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Iversenfs Memorandum") if 1 (R. 158); Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Monroe Iversenfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum") at 2 (R. 188)(these facts were 
undisputed). 
2 
that Mr. Iversen would supply a truck and trailer and drive it. He 
was to be paid at the rate of $55.00 per hour.6 
At the time of the accident in which Mr. Smith was injured, 
James Cape was operating a continuously moving paving machine. 
Trucks, such as that owned and operated by Mr. Iversen, were 
picking up loads of wet concrete at a concrete batch plant operated 
by James Cape approximately fifteen hundred yards away from the 
paver, transporting it to the paver, and dumping it on the roadway 
immediately in front of the paving machine. Mr. Smith was injured 
when the truck owned and operated by Mr. Iversen backed into him.7 
Mr. Iversenfs truck did not have a backup warning device on it.8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Iversenfs status as a statutory employee of James Cape and 
a fellow employee of Mr. Smith does not relieve him from liability 
in this case based upon his breach of his duty as a lessor of the 
truck that struck and seriously injured Mr. Smith. Finding Mr. 
Iversen to be a fellow employee of Mr. Smith does not provide Mr. 
Iversen with a blanket immunity from liability for all of his 
actions on a particular job site. It does not eliminate his 
liability in a wholesale fashion. Rather, it only insulates Mr. 
6
 Iversenfs Memorandum 1f 3 (R. 158); Plaintiff's Memorandum 
at 2 (R. 188) (undisputed facts). 
7
 Iversen's Memorandum ir 6 (R. 158-59); Plaintiff's 
Memorandum at 2 (R. 188) (undisputed facts). 
8
 Plaintiff's Memorandum, Additional Material Facts 1f 5 (R. 
189); Reply Memorandum in Support of Iversen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 3 (R. 198)(undisputed fact). 
3 
Iversen from liability for his negligent conduct as an employee. 
Mr. Iversenfs other connection with the job site, as a lessor, 
imposes duties upon him commensurate with that status, which if 
breached, form the basis for liability to Mr. Smith. The District 
Court failed to properly take these arguments into consideration 
when granting Mr. Iversenfs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
MR. IVERSEN LEASED AN ADMITTEDLY 
DEFECTIVE TRUCK TO RALPH SMITH 
COMPANY; AS THE LESSOR OF THE TRUCK, 
MR. IVERSEN IS NOT IMMUNE FROM 
LIABILITY AS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE. 
In an action by an employee against a co-etmployee, the burden 
is upon the co-employee to establish that the lawsuit is barred due 
to the Worker's Compensation Act.9 The burden of establishing this 
defense, therefore, rests upon Mr. Iversen in this case. 
In addition to providing his services and driving the truck 
under his agreement with Ralph Smith Company, Mr. Iversen also 
leased his truck to Ralph Smith Company. Mr. Iversen admits that 
he did not have a backup warning device on his truck as required by 
UDOT standards. Consequently, regardless of whether Mr. Iversen 
was an employee of Ralph Smith Company or James Cape, his second, 
independent relationship with Ralph Smith Company was that of a 
lessor of equipment. He can be found independently liable to Mr. 
Smith for failing to have a backup warning device upon the truck he 
9
 E.g., Basin Land Irrigation Co. v. Hat Butte Canal Co., 114 
Idaho 121, 754 P.2d 434 (198B); Ortolano v. Las Vegas Convention 
Service, 96 Nev. 308, 608 P.2d 11U3, IlUb (iy«U). 
4 
leased to Ralph Smith Company. 
On appeal, Mr, Smith conceded that Mr. Iversen was a statutory 
employee of James Cape, making him immune from any claim Mr. Smith 
may have against Mr. Iversen based upon Mr. Iversenf s conduct as an 
employee.10 For example, in Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 
442 P.2d 31 (1968), a truck owner who orally contracted to furnish 
his truck, including a driver, to the plaintiff's employer to be 
utilized to haul dirt for the plaintiff's employer. This Court 
found the defendant truck owner to be an employee of the 
plaintiff's employer, thus insulating him from liability. The 
Gallegos case, however, does not disclose whether the plaintiff's 
injuries were sustained as a result of the alleged negligent 
conduct of the driver of the truck or as a result of defective 
equipment. If the allegations were based upon negligent conduct of 
the driver, as opposed to an allegation of faulty or defective 
equipment, the result in the Gallegos case certainly is correct. 
There are a number of cases that recognize that a lessor of 
equipment is not immune from liability for personal injuries due to 
a Worker's Compensation Act.11 Mr. Iversen's liability to Mr. 
Smith is that of a lessor of defective equipment. 
Recognizing Mr. Iversen1s capacity as a fellow employee, with 
10
 Utah Code Anno. §§ 35-1-42 & 35-1-60. 
11
 E.g., Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 
P. 2d 256 fT97uH lessor of trucxj; Kian v> Imperial Municipal 
Services Group, Inc., 768 P.2d 1260 (Colo. App. 1$88); Urtolano v. 
Las vegas convention Service, 608 P.2d at 1105. 
5 
its corresponding duties, and Mr, Iversenfs capacity as a lessor, 
with its corresponding duties, is similar to the dual capacity 
doctrine applied in cases where employees bring lawsuits against 
their employers. In these dual capacity doctrine cases, the theory 
of liability is based upon the employer's second capacity that 
confers upon him obligations independent of those imposed upon him 
as an employer.12 The dual capacity doctrine is equally applicable 
to a co-employee situation, such as the instant case.13 Mr. 
Iversenfs second capacity as a lessor conferred upon him 
obligations independent of those imposed upon him as a co-employee. 
The manner in which the truck was maintained is a different set of 
obligations than the manner in which Mr. Iversen operated the 
truck. For example, an employee would not be under an obligation 
to install missing safety equipment on the truck he was driving, 
such as a backup warning device. A lessor would be under such an 
obligation. Mr. Iversen is liable to Mr. Smith for failing to 
install a backup warning device, but is not liable to Mr. Smith for 
his negligent operation of the truck which struck and injured Mr. 
Smith. 
Due to Mr. Smith's concession, the posture of this case is no 
12
 Anno., 23 A.L.R.4th 1151 (1983); see Stewart v. CMI Corp., 
740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987)(recognized 5TTT neitner adopted nor 
applied the dual capacity doctrine); Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 
P. 2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985)(recognized But neitner adopted nor 
applied the dual capacity doctrine). 
13
 Kimball v. Millet, 52 Wash. App. 512, 762 P. 2d 10 
(1988) (dual capacity doctrine applicable to co-employees as well as 
to employers). 
6 
different than if Mr. Iversen were joined as a defendant in this 
case based upon his lease of his defective truck to James Cape. 
Whether he was a statutory employee of James Cape is of no concern: 
Mr. Iversen's status as a statutory employee does not relieve him 
from liability imposed from some other source, such as his status 
as a lessor and the commensurate duty with that status to supply 
equipment in a nondefective condition. Consequently, the District 
Court errored in granting Mr. Iversenfs Motion for Summary Judgment 
to the extent that it dismissed Mr. Iversen from the case despite 
Mr. Smith's allegations that Mr. Iversen breached his duty of due 
care as a lessor of the defective truck that injured Mr. Smith. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Iversen was Mr. Smith's fellow employee, insulating Mr. 
Iversen from liability as a result of his conduct as a fellow 
employee. His status as a fellow employee, however, does not 
relieve him from his breach of his duties to Mr. Smith as a lessor 
of the truck. Because Mr. Iversen breached his duty as a lessor of 
the truck that injured Mr. Smith, the District Court improperly 
granted Mr. Iversenfs Summary Judgment. This Court should reverse 
the District Court's Summary Judgment to the extent of reinstating 
the allegations relating to Mr. Iversenfs breach of his duties as 
7 
a lessor of his defective truck to James Cape. 
Dated: February 13, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
>far fe^A. LarseJh ger
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
B. L. Dart 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
DISMISSING MONROE IVERSEN 
i Civil No. 890901959 PI 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
This matter came on for hearing on May 14, 1990 upon 
the motion of Monroe Iversen (Iversen) for summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as against him. The Court, 
(J U*iAiVyp'*r* 
,.- - * < 1 
having reviewed the file and memoranda of counsel and having 
heard the arguments of counsel, now enters its Order granting 
Iversen9s motion as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Complaint as 
against Monroe Iversen is dismissed with prejudice. The Court 
specifically determines pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure that there is no just reason for delay 
and expressly directs and enters final judgment of dismissal. 
DATED this *%tf day of /s/tf^r , 1990. 
BY THE^ 
THE^HONORABLE JAMESES. SAWAYA 
JUDGE, THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
2 
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